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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900218-CA
Priority No. 2

MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because the search in this case was a warrantless search,
it was the State's burden to justify it. The State failed to meet
this burden.
This Court should reach the merits of the issues raised by
Mr. Velasquez and reverse the trial court's order denying the motion
to suppress the evidence seized in the warrantless search.

ARGUMENT
THE STATE FAILED IN ITS
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL BURDEN
TO JUSTIFY THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH
IN THIS CASE.
In response to Mr. Velasquez's contentions that the stop,
search, and seizure were pretextual and violated Mr. Velasquez's
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution, the State argues that Mr. Velasquez
waived all of these issues. Appellee's brief at 1 through 13. The

State concludes that this Court should either affirm the trial
court's ruling or remand this case for rehearing of the impound and
inventory issues. Appellee's brief at 13.

A. IT WAS THE STATE'S SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL
DUTY TO JUSTIFY WARRANTLESS SEARCHES.
It was the State's burden of proof to justify the
warrantless search by showing that it falls within an exception to
the warrant requirement.
1990).

State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah

Burdens of proof are not merely substantive, but encompass

procedural responsibilities as well.

As the court explained in

Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Company, §59 P.2d 1040
(Utah 1983),
For a question to be considered on appeal, the
record must clearly show that it was timely
presented to the trial court in a manner
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; we cannot
merely assume that it was properly raised. The
burden is on the parties to make certciin that the
record they compile will adequately preserve
their arguments for review in the event of an
appeal.
Id. at 1045 (citations omitted).
At trial, the prosecutor noted the State's burden to
justify the warrantless search, and voiced appreciation for
Mr. Velasquez's pretrial motion to suppress, stating,
Although it is Mr. Valdez's motion, there is no
search warrant here. It is my understanding it
is our burden to go forward. I would compliment
Mr. Valdez on one of the points that I have been
taking irritation with over the past several
years. He has made specific allegations in here
rather than the boilerplate motion, and we would
call Officer Hedenstrom to the stand.
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(T. 2).
Because it was the State's burden to justify the
warrantless search, the State's arguments that defense counsel
waived the issues briefed in Mr. Velasquez's appeal have
questionable legal relevance.
As a factual matter, however, defense counsel brought to
the trial court's attention every issue presented by Mr. Velasquez
on appeal, except for whether the subjective intent of a police
officer should be explicitly recognized as a pertinent consideration
in pretext cases under Article I section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.^

1. The absence of the state constitutional argument may be
explained by the fact that this case was heard on March 20 and 22,
1990, before the filing of the State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah
May 30, 1990), decision giving an independent interpretation of the
Utah Constitution's search and seizure provision. See State v.
Hargraves, case number 890684-CA, slip opinion at 5 (Utah Ct. App.
Feb. 7, 1991)(this Court addressed search and seizure issue for the
first time on appeal because the case was heard prior to the filing
of a determinative decision by the Utah Supreme Court). As noted in
Appellant's opening brief, the Larocco decision departs from the
federal line of cases by making exclusion of evidence "a necessary
consequence of police violations of article I section 14," id. at
25. Thus the evidence of an officer's subjective state of mind is
not limited in relevance to the exclusion question under Utah law,
as it is under the federal case law. See brief of Appellant at
15-16, discussing Larocco and Scott v. United States. 436 U.S. 128
(1978).
The State argues that as a policy matter, objective
standards are preferable to subjective inquiries, because objective
standards supposedly facilitate "evenhanded law enforcement."
Appellee's brief at 6. This policy argument should be compared with
a countervailing one explained by reference to State v. Arroyo, 796
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), in which the Utah Supreme Court recognized in
the context of consent searches that ignoring government misconduct
(footnote continues)
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At the pretrial motion to suppress, defense counsel cited
Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution, and specifically noted
that the search was warrantless and the stop was pretextual
(R. 25). At the hearing on the motion to suppress, defense counsel
referred to South Dakota v, Opperman, 428 U.S. 328 (1976), and
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App.), limited, 796 P.2d 689
(Utah 1990), providing the court with a copy of Sierra and asking
the court to read the cases prior to ruling on the motion (T. 15).
Defense counsel noted that the State had failed to present adequate
proof that the search was an inventory search, and brought the
court's attention to the pretext issue as follows,
In addition to that, Judge, the other thing
is to, and you will see that in the State v.
Sierra, they have indicated, yes, a police
officer may however stop an automobile for a
traffic violation committed in the officer's
presence. Well, it had two different plates on
it, although it was properly registered.
But it goes on to say in Sierra on page 977:
"It is impermissible for law enforcement officers
to use a misdemeanor arrest as a pretext to
search for evidence of a more serious crime.11

(footnote 1 continued)
defeats the two purposes of the federal exclusionary rule—deterring
misconduct by law enforcement and preventing courts from
participating in the violation of rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures. See id. at 16. Focusing on objective
standards of reasonableness in pretext cases and ignoring evidence
of subjective intent encourages police misconduct by glossing over
it. By leaving courts to hypothesize explanations for search and
seizure violations, a strictly objective standard may involve courts
in perpetuating those violations. See State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d
460, 473 (Utah 1990)(purposes of Utah exclusionary rule are open to
interpretation).
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It is our position that that is what occurred
here, Judge, and the items that were found ought to
be suppressed.
(T. 17-18).
The prosecutor acknowledged and disputed defense counsels
contention that the stop was pretextual and argued that the search
was a proper inventory search (T. 15-16, 20).
The trial court apparently recognized the general
reasonable suspicion/hypothetical officer test frequently applied in
pretext cases:
THE COURT:
We have a car with different
license plates. We have the officer not
remembering if there was a registration or not.
We have the defendant without a driver's license,
and so what would the reasonable officer do if he
pulls anyone over at that point? I haven't heard
anything. If he hadn't had a registration, then
it certainly would have been justified to impound
the car. You don't know if it is stolen, or you
don't know what the story is.
MR. LEMKE: Or if the driver was under arrest,
Your Honor, and there was no one else there that
could drive the car away
THE COURT: The problem I have with that, is
everyone that is driving a car without a driver's
license arrested and taken to jail? That is kind
of—Maybe they ought to be, but I am kind of
shocked why—What's the circumstances here?
There has to be something articulable.
(T. 20-21).
In light of the State's procedural and substantive burden
to justify the warrantless search, and the record in this case, this
Court should disregard the State's arguments that Mr. Velasquez
waived all of the issues raised on appeal, and should reject the
State's intimation that this Court should remand this case to the
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trial court so that the prosecution can take a second bite at the
apple,

B. THE STATE FAILED TO JUSTIFY THE WARRANTLESS
SEARCH.
The State's discussion of the merits of this case appears
in part of footnote 7, as follows:
Notwithstanding the above, should this Court
look past defendant's waiver to address the
merits of this case based on the record currently
before it, the State acknowledges that Officer
Hedenstrom's conclusory testimony alone may be
insufficient for this Court to determine whether
the inventory was conducted pursuant to
"established reasonable procedures."
Appellee's brief at 12.
Officer Hedenstrom's testimony not only fails to provide
necessary details showing that the warrantless search in this case
fell within the "inventory search" exception to the warrant
requirement, but also provides the detail necessary to show that the
warrantless search in this case cannot be justified as an inventory
search.

Officer Hedenstrom testified that one of the purposes of

the inventory search was to gather "any evidence" (T. 6, 14). As
the court noted in State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), "the
inventory exception does not apply when the inventory is merely a
'pretext concealing an investigatory police motive.'"
267-268 (citation omitted).
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Id. at

CONCLUSION
The State failed to justify the warrantless search, and
Mr. Velasquez is entitled to an order reversing the trial court's
order denying his motion to suppress.
Respectfully submitted this (&£

day of March,

1991.
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